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Rodger A. Payne 

In an important monograph published in 191, Thomas Schelling and 
Morton Halperin argued that arms control and military policy should 
be committed to the same fundamental security purposes—preventing 
war, minimizing the costs and risks of arms competition, and curtailing 
the scope and violence of war in the event it should occur.1 The strate­
gists, writing primarily about the budding nuclear age and the missiles 
then being deployed, additionally emphasized that arms controllers and 
military planners alike should be committed to developing secure arsenals 
that do not invite war. In particular, especially vulnerable and danger­
ously provocative weapons systems should be limited because they might 
tempt or encourage preemptive or even preventive war. In the preface to 
the 1985 reprint edition, Schelling and Halperin note that this strategic 
understanding of arms control “is now widely accepted.”2 Indeed, their 
strategic logic continues to have significant influence.3 
Despite the continued utility of the “strategy of arms control,” we argue in 
this article that the international community is constructing an ill-considered 
and potentially dangerous biological weapons taboo that rebukes its funda­
mental logic. For decades, states attempted to develop an arms control regime 
that limited both the acquisition and use of biological weapons. However, ef­
forts to limit biological weapons capabilities have now stalled, even as prohibi­
tions on biological weapons use have been maintained and even strengthened. 
The resulting regime effectively allows states to retain suspicious capabilities 
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The Illogic of the Biological Weapons Taboo 
that are inevitably viewed as threatening by many of their peers. In turn, rely­
ing upon states to uphold a taboo against using these weapons seems increas­
ingly irrelevant in a world where nonstate actors might too readily acquire 
or develop dangerous capabilities. These developments are particularly worri­
some in an international context featuring a large number of states embracing 
the logic of preventive counterproliferation—and attributing hostile inten­
tions to “evil” or “outlaw” states defined by their domestic political structure, 
nonsecular leadership, alleged links to transnational terrorist groups, and/or 
perceived hostility toward other states. 
We begin with a brief review of the classic strategic logic of arms control. 
Next, we provide a description of the evolution of the biological weapons 
regime, ending with an overview of the 2001 proposed verification proto­
col to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and subsequent efforts 
to strengthen the regime. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the 
perils of a biological weapons taboo that appears to preserve deadly capa­
bilities while greatly fearing and absolutely prohibiting their use. While 
many political observers are hopeful that Barack Obama will rebuff the 
preventive counterproliferation policy emphasized by George W. Bush’s 
presidential administration, we argue that the Obama administration is 
preserving reckless elements of the so-called Bush Doctrine. 
The Strategy of Arms Control 
Schelling and Halperin persuasively argued that arms control—includ­
ing informal or tacit agreements as well as disarmament measures which 
they subsumed as arms control—should involve collaborative adjustment 
of military force postures so as to avoid war, minimize the costs and risks 
of arms competition, and curtail “the scope and violence of war in the 
event it occurs.” As the authors wrote, “The aims of arms control and 
the aims of national military strategy should be substantially the same” 
and should “serve the security of the nation.”4 In other words, the goal of 
arms control should be entirely consistent with the central purpose of a 
military strategy like deterrence. The preeminent purpose is the reduction 
of the risk of war, which they claimed could be significantly influenced 
by the character of the military force posture. As Schelling and Halperin 
noted, “A main determinant of the likelihood of war is the nature of 
present military technology and present military expectations.”5 Indeed, 
the monograph explicitly encouraged security policy makers to think in 
broad strategic terms about both arms control and military force postures. 
Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Spring 2010 [  ] 
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Arms control does not mean simply reducing the quantity of accumulated 
weapons or foregoing all new technological developments. Rather, arms 
controllers and military planners should be strategists seeking to eliminate 
the most dangerous kinds of weapons, even as they preserve—and perhaps 
increase—forces that contribute to security. 
According to this logic, if weapons provoke especially perilous responses 
from a potential opponent, then arms controllers and military planners 
should seek to limit those weapons in favor of systems that can achieve se­
curity objectives like deterrence and stability without the heightened risks. 
In particular, Schelling and Halperin were concerned with characteristics 
of weapons that might invite preemptive or even preventive war. In the 
case of nuclear arsenals, for example, experts in the 190s and early 1980s 
debated whether land-based missile systems make for especially vulner­
able and tempting first-strike targets. Historically, these arms have often 
been vulnerably deployed in fixed silos and featured capabilities that make 
them especially threatening to a foe—very accurate guidance systems and 
substantial warhead throw weight that assures significant hard-target kill 
capability. Such systems are viewed as far more dangerous and confronta­
tional than are more mobile and survivable weapons that are more likely 
to be perceived as second-strike retaliatory systems, such as long-range 
bomber forces or nuclear-armed submarines. Schelling and Halperin also 
argued that arms control can reduce the risk of accidental war, primarily 
via improvements in command, control, and communication. 
Against the backdrop of the Cold War, the strategic approach to arms 
control emphasized and urged joint American-Soviet management of mili­
tary capabilities rather than political efforts to reduce hostile intentions. 
Reducing the “capabilities for destruction” is a central goal of arms control, 
after all, and Schelling and Halperin devoted most of their attention to 
the manipulation of armaments to reduce the incentives for war. Put dif­
ferently, the strategists emphasized the “direct relation of arms control to the 
military environment” rather than to the political or psychological realm. 
They did not promote arms control primarily as a “confidence building 
measure” (CBM), even though they recognized that arms control might 
“create confidence and trust.”8 By Holst’s classic definition, CBMs are 
“arrangements designed to enhance such assurance of mind and belief in 
the trustworthiness of states and the facts they create;” thus, arms control 
might serve to increase “the trustworthiness of the announced intentions of 
other states in respect of their security policies.”9 Yet, Schelling and Halperin 
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The Illogic of the Biological Weapons Taboo 
pointed out that arms control might in some circumstances “create suspi­
cion and irritation” and thus “worsen tensions rather than relieve them.”10 
This seems to have been a prescient forecast about contemporary politics 
as many states worry that other states might develop arsenals that call into 
question their nonproliferation commitments. Estimates of another state’s 
intentions are “necessarily . . . uncertain,” emphasize Schelling and Hal­
perin. By contrast, “Measures reciprocally [structured] to reduce capabilities 
for preclusive attack may help” all parties in an arms agreement.11 
Given this emphasis on manipulating capabilities rather than intentions, 
the strategic approach to arms control is consistent with well-known theo­
ries of international relations (IR). Most prominently, many realists have 
long argued, as John Mearsheimer recently did, that “states can never be 
certain about other states’ intentions. . . . intentions are impossible to di­
vine with 100 percent certainty.” He continued, “Potential adversaries have 
incentives to misrepresent their own strength or weakness, and to conceal 
their true aims.”12 Realists, therefore, focus on the material capability of 
states “to threaten each other,” and such tangible means are said to be the 
“key factor that drives fear levels up and down.”13 While classic realists like 
Hans Morgenthau built an IR theory around national interests and hu­
man nature (a “will to power”), they nonetheless generally agree that state 
intentions are difficult to ascertain. Interests for Morgenthau were defined 
in terms of power, which is primarily evaluated in terms of a state’s material 
capabilities. It “is both futile and deceptive,” argued Morgenthau, to search 
for motives “because motives are the most illusive of psychological data, 
distorted as they are, frequently beyond recognition, by the interests and 
emotions of actor and observer alike.”14 
In sum, strategists view arms control as a mechanism for achieving primary se­
curity goals, such as reducing the likelihood and costs of war. Additionally, arms 
control should be primarily concerned with manipulating material capabilities 
rather than signaling or understanding national intentions. States fear accumu­
lated capabilities, largely because intentions are very difficult to determine. 
Limiting Biological Weapons: Arms Control or Taboo? 
This section briefly surveys the history of efforts to limit the develop­
ment and potential use of biological weapons. The evidence reveals that 
initial arms control efforts in this area sought only to restrict the use of 
these “poison” weapons. Ultimately, the agreements were broadened to 
limit capabilities as well. The most recent changes, however, reflect a form 
Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Spring 2010 [ 9 ] 
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of backtracking. Arguably, stymied by states’ failure to agree about verifi­
cation procedures, a sweeping arms control and disarmament regime has 
been transformed into a taboo that attempts primarily to preclude the use 
of bioweapons. Contemporary limits on capabilities have been weakened 
politically, and the prospects for stronger limits do not look good. 
Attempts by mankind to utilize human disease as a weapon of war has 
an ancient lineage. According to Thomas J. Johnson, “The use of biological 
pathogens—bacteria, viruses, fungi and toxins—to kill or incapacitate one’s 
enemies has a long pedigree that includes not only Scythian arrows, 
but the poisoned wells of Sparta, Persia, Rome and others.”15 Before the 
advent of modern medical science, combatants projected infected human 
corpses into enemy encampments, released plague-infested rats, or distrib­
uted contaminated clothing to civilian populations in the hopes of spread­
ing human disease to the enemy.1 Largely because of the lack of medical 
and scientific knowledge at the time, these crude methods of biological 
warfare were of limited military effectiveness. However, the discovery of 
the germ theory for human disease in the nineteenth century potentially 
changed how biological warfare could be waged. The introduction of the 
agar plate and sterile technique methods made it possible for scientists to 
isolate pathogenic bacterial strains. While the development of closed sterile 
fermentation processes during the 1940s allowed scientists to grow large-
scale quantities of microbes for the production of vaccines and antibiotics, 
it also became possible for medical scientists to harness the reproductive 
power of human pathogens for military means. Furthermore, the advent 
of recombinant DNA technology in the 190s bestowed upon scientists 
the power to manipulate the genes of microbes. While recombinant DNA 
technology made it possible to produce human insulin on a large scale, it 
also provided the potential means for scientists to produce more infectious 
pathogens through the use of genetic manipulation. Indeed, the reproduc­
tive capacity of bacteria and viruses make such organisms more deadly on 
a per-weight basis than conventional or chemical weapons. 
Ultimately, the discovery, production, and utilization of chemical weapons 
in wartime provided the impetus for banning the use of biological weapons. In 
the public mind, the histories of chemical and biological weapons are linked.1 
Both types of weapons were first discovered in research laboratories, although 
chemists were much further along in developing chemical weapons during the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries than biologists or medical scien­
tists were with biological armaments. In any case, the scientific achieve­
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ment of creating poison gases instigated the first international attempts to 
ban the use of chemical weapons during war. A similar ban on bioweapons 
eventually followed. 
A relatively small group of states, most of them European, attempted to 
draft international rules restraining the conduct of war at the First Peace 
Conference at The Hague in 1899. The discussion at this conference was 
aimed at limiting the use of certain newly developed weapons—including 
submarine mines and torpedoes, balloons, and explosives. All warfare and 
weapons are potentially deadly; thus, the conference focused on reducing 
“the excessive armaments which weigh upon all nations.” According to 
Richard Price, “Technologies were not regarded as in and of themselves 
immoral; their moral value was understood to depend upon how they 
were used.”18 Chemical weapons were treated uniquely as an absolute ban 
was applied only to chemical weapons and dum-dum bullets. The ban 
on chemical weapons was reaffirmed at the second Hague Conference of 
190. The conferees failed to enact the other parts of the arms control 
agenda outlined for the meeting. 
The Hague Conference results can be viewed as extraordinary because 
chemical weapons had not been fully developed and, in fact, had not yet 
been used in battle. Usually, newly implemented technologies of war are 
denounced by victims, or by competitors who lack these new weapons. In 
this case, the conferees proscribed an undeveloped and untried military 
technology.19 Unfortunately, the chemical weapons ban included no 
enforcement mechanism, and this shortcoming became crucially important 
during World War I as foes in the conflict used chemical weapons on a large 
scale. In turn, reports from the warfront about the use of chemical weapons 
painted pictures of horror for civilians back home. Indeed, contemporary 
accounts, which revealed significant casualties from the use of chemical 
agents, undoubtedly influenced the debate about the status of such weapons: 
During the World War a total of about 100,000 tons of gas was used by the vari­
ous nations involved. The gas casualties produced have been estimated at 534,000 
for France, Great Britain, the United States, Italy and Germany and of those 
casualties approximately 4.2 percent resulted in death. As regards Russia the facts 
are uncertain. Her troops were poorly protected against gas, however, and suffered 
heavily; the gas casualties in the Russian armies have been estimated at 45,000, 
of which 11. percent resulted in death.20 
Today, it is estimated that about 1.3 million people were injured and over 
90,000 died as a result of gas use in the First World War.21 France, Ger-
Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Spring 2010 [ 11 ] 
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many, Great Britain, and the United States employed these weapons dur­
ing the conflict. 
Public disgust with the use of chemical weapons in WWI pushed states 
to further limit their potential use. After the war, in fact, states held a se­
ries of international peace and disarmament conferences in hopes of limit­
ing the awfulness of armed conflict. One tangible product of these meet­
ings was the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which reaffirmed the ban on the 
use of chemical weapons. This agreement also included a prohibition on 
the use of biological weapons—then typically called bacteriological weap­
ons—in warfare. The formal Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War 
of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods 
of Warfare (Geneva Protocol) did not restrict biological weapons research 
programs, nor did it bar the development and stockpiling of bioweapons. 
Furthermore, states that signed and/or ratified the Protocol insisted on 
maintaining a right to retaliate in-kind if they were attacked with biological 
or chemical weapons. Many nations used this opening as an entryway to 
develop bioweapons. As noted by Jeanne Guillemin, France started a bio­
logical weapons research program in 1921 and continued it until 1940. 
Japan began a biological weapons program in 1929, and the Soviet Union 
initiated a biological weapons program in the 1930s.22 
British and US biological weapons programs were precipitated by the 
behavior of other major powers during World War II.23 Following the 
familiar logic of the security dilemma, Britain and the United States acted 
out of fear that Germany and Japan were working to develop biological 
weapons. In order to have a retaliatory capacity against potential biological 
weapons attack, “the US Army established a biological warfare research 
program in 1941 through its Chemical Warfare Service.”24 As explained 
by biological weapons specialist Jonathon Tucker, this biological warfare 
research program was initiated “despite the deeply rooted international 
norm against the military use of poison and disease.”25 The Allied victory 
at the end of WWII did not eliminate fears related to the potential use 
of biological weapons. The Cold War competition with the Soviet Union 
motivated the United States, for example, to continue its efforts to de­
velop biological weapons. In fact, recent scholarship notes that the US 
government enacted policies to place biological warfare research on par 
with the far more prominent nuclear weapons program.2 At its height in 
199, the US biological weapons program employed approximately 3,000 
scientists, technicians, and other workers. 
[ 12 ] Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Spring 2010 
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In due course, events in the 190s conspired against supporters of the 
US biological weapons program. For example, American military forces 
utilized tear gas and herbicides during the Vietnam War on a massive 
scale.2 The executive branch argued that the use of these agents did not 
violate the Geneva Protocol because the treaty ostensibly banned only le­
thal chemical weapons. However, an overwhelming number of UN Gen­
eral Assembly member states condemned the American interpretation as 
contrary to international law.28 Moreover, domestic critics of this policy 
and rationale, including many prominent congressional figures, pointed 
out the fallacy of nonlethality. Tear gas and herbicides were employed 
to roust enemy combatants from cover or to control rioting in South 
Vietnam. Reports from Vietnam revealed that helicopters targeted large 
numbers of tear gas grenades on Vietcong strongholds, a tactic which was 
followed immediately by B-52s dropping high-explosive or antipersonnel 
fragmentation bombs. The attacks seemed to be conducted to flush out 
those hiding in tunnels (whether civilian or combatants), to incapacitate 
them with gas, and then to wound or kill them with bombs rather than 
to capture them. This tactic appeared to be wholly inconsistent with the 
humanitarian justifications offered publicly by the United States.29 
Additionally, accidents during testing and transport publicly highlighted 
the dangers of poison weapons.30 Because of the perceived link between 
biological and chemical weapons, negative press on chemical weapons 
usage and development spilled over to taint the biological weapons research 
program as well. In fact, public outcry over the use of chemical weapons 
led the Congress in 19 to begin hearings on US chemical and biological 
weapons programs. Moreover, the Nixon administration ordered a review 
of those programs, which continued to be linked together.31 The review 
concluded that the United States should forgo the development and use of 
biological weapons. As a follow-up, President Nixon announced in 199 
that the United States would unilaterally destroy its stockpile of biological 
weapons, though the US government would continue a small defensive re­
search program. Nixon’s words were soon followed by visible and concrete 
disarmament actions. From May 191 to May 192, the Department 
of Defense destroyed its antipersonnel biological agent stockpiles stored 
at the Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas, “including 220 pounds of dried 
anthrax bacteria, 804 pounds of dried tularemia bacteria, 334 pounds of 
dried Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE) virus, 4,991 gallons of liquid 
VEE viral suspension, 5,098 gallons of Q fever rickettsia suspension, and 
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tens of thousands of munitions filled with biological and toxin agents and 
stimulants.”32 Furthermore, the Pentagon cut the biological research bud­
get in half—from $20 million per year to $10 million—and switched the 
focus of the programs exclusively to defensive purposes. 
The Nixon administration also successfully negotiated the Biological 
Weapons Convention of 192, which was accomplished in a UN disarma­
ment forum. President Nixon and other administration officials involved 
with the negotiations often emphasized Washington’s desire to prohibit 
the use of biological weapons under any conditions.33 However, the BWC 
banned the development and stockpiling of biological weapons as well. It 
was signed and ratified by the United States and many other countries, be­
coming effective in 195. As of March 2009, 13 states are parties to the 
treaty. John Parachini of RAND describes the BWC, along with the chem­
ical weapons convention (which went into force in 199), as “declarations 
that the international community bans germ and chemical weapons as taboo 
instruments of war.”34 In fact, the 192 Biological Weapons Convention is 
considered the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning the produc­
tion and use of an entire category of weapons. It arguably reflects a strong 
international normative consensus as biological weapons programs were 
stripped of any claim to military legitimacy. Essentially, any nation pursu­
ing an offensive program had to do so secretly and illegally. Unfortunately, 
at the time the treaty was completed, this was not considered an especially 
onerous task. As authors Marie Chevrier and Iris Hunger note, “Effec­
tive verification was thought to be impossible, and the treaty was therefore 
given quite modest provisions to address compliance issues.”35 Nonethe­
less, the total prohibition of the development and possession of biological 
weapons distinguishes this second phase of bioweapons arms control from 
the first. Under the prior Geneva Protocol, as noted, neither the develop­
ment nor the possession of such weapons had been outlawed.3 
Activists who viewed biological weapons as immoral applauded Nixon’s 
decision to end American involvement in offensive biological weapons 
development, but the policy reflected strong strategic considerations as 
well. First, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger emphasized that 
the unpredictability of biological weapons limited their utility for retalia­
tion and deterrence; hence, their greatest value was as a first-use weapon.3 
Potentially, such an attack could be quite devastating as relatively small 
quantities of biological agents could infect thousands of people (or more), 
create a genuine health care emergency, and thereby incite national panic. 
[ 14 ] Strategic Studies Quarterly ♦ Spring 2010 
03-Payne 01\06\10.indd   15 1/29/10   10:53:34 AM





          
        
         
         
         
       
       
         
        
            
        
 
The Illogic of the Biological Weapons Taboo 
Second, Nixon and his advisors sought to prevent a biological arms race 
with non–status quo nations, or so-called challenger states.38 Then, as now, 
the United States viewed biological weapons as “a poor nation’s weapon 
of mass destruction,” and officials recognized great potential American 
vulnerability to deadly attack.39 In comparison to nuclear weapons, for 
instance, bioweapons are both easier and less expensive to manufacture 
and require almost undetectable laboratory space. The estimated capital 
infrastructure cost of a 200-square-foot laboratory to produce anthrax is 
estimated to be around $220,000 dollars.40 Low economic costs may lend 
an allure to biological weapons as an easy pathway to power for challenger 
states that lack the economic resources for nuclear weapons development 
and production, which is infrastructure heavy and almost surely requires 
a minimum investment of billions of dollars.41 
In addition to their low cost, biological weapons are potentially attractive 
to challenger states because they represent a knowledge-intensive enterprise. 
The expertise for biological weapons development is based upon research 
that is widely disseminated by government agencies, universities, and other 
scientific organizations for the purpose of stimulating scientific process or 
finding practical applications to human medicine. Vaccine development 
and biological weapons programs alike utilize the same highly desired bio­
technology. Conceivably, challenger states could use legitimate pharma­
ceutical manufacturing sites intended for vaccine production as cover for 
biological weapons research and development.42 Indeed, tens of thousands 
of scientists and technicians all over the world already possess some of the 
basic knowledge necessary to perform biological weapons research.43 
The dual development problem is not merely a theoretical concern. As 
former Russian president Boris Yeltsin publicly acknowledged in 1992, the 
Soviet Union grossly violated the terms of the BWC by actively weapon­
izing several human pathogens as part of a clandestine biological weapons 
program.44 Though the Soviet Union was an advanced industrial state, its 
subterfuge in this area could be emulated and duplicated by smaller and 
poorer nations. In fact, though Iraq signed the BWC in 192, the Iraqi 
government, too, hid a secret biological weapons program under the guise 
of legitimate pharmaceutical research. This was not discovered by the rest 
of the world until inspectors entered Iraq after the Persian Gulf War in 
1991. The apparent Soviet and Iraqi ability to avoid treaty limits on re­
search and development casts significant doubt about the ability of the 
BWC to provide meaningful limits on bioweapons proliferation. 
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The Verification Protocol to the BWC 
Given the violations of the BWC by nations that ratified the treaty and 
the continued expectation of scientific advances in biotechnology, the 
Third Review Conference of the BWC in 1991 recommended convening 
a group of scientific and technical experts (called “VEREX,” for verifi­
cation experts) to consider verification procedures for biological research 
programs. Based upon carefully agreed parameters, the VEREX group 
soon recommended and established a forum for negotiating legally bind­
ing verification methods for the BWC. This forum, known as the Ad Hoc 
Group, worked from 1995 to 2001 to draft a protocol creating meaning­
ful new verification procedures.45 In 2001, the final draft was presented 
to the membership of the BWC for consideration. However, the United 
States rejected the draft protocol that July and called for terminating the 
Ad Hoc Group at the December meeting of the parties. The United States 
objected to the proposed verification regime, primarily because it viewed 
the planned procedures as insufficient for detecting cheating, though offi­
cials also argued that the procedures would be prohibitively expensive and 
unworkable. Amb. Donald Mahley, the US special negotiator for chemical 
and biological arms control issues, argued in 2001 that no accurate, timely, 
or comprehensive inventory of potential bioweapons facilities could be 
compiled given the fact that almost any serious biological research facility 
would be “capable under some parameters, of being diverted to biological 
weapons work. Trying to catalog them all would be tantamount to impos­
sible.”4 Moreover, American officials often claimed that the procedures 
would jeopardize trade secrets of the pharmaceutical industry and com­
promise the security of US biodefense programs. Critics of the US posi­
tion argued that the superpower obstinately and severely damaged efforts 
to build an effective biological weapons regime based on arms control and 
disarmament.4 US officials responded by pointing to proposed substitute 
measures that would further criminalize bioterrorism, strengthen export 
controls, and encourage non–legally binding compliance protocols. In 
general, however, as shall be explored more extensively in the following 
section, the United States all-too-often highlights “the issue of BWC com­
pliance solely by ‘naming names’ of countries it suspects of violations.”48 
The US suggestion to criminalize bioterrorism was adopted unani­
mously by the UN Security Council in April 2004. Specifically, UNSC 
Resolution 1540 obligates states “to refrain from supporting by any means 
non-State actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, 
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transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical or biological weap­
ons and their delivery systems.” Additionally, Resolution 1540 imposes 
binding obligations on all states “to establish domestic controls to prevent 
the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and their 
means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls over re­
lated materials.”49 Finally, the resolution also encourages additional inter­
national cooperation on existing nonproliferation measures. 
A 1540 Committee was established to collect written reports from UN 
member states and to establish a database to evaluate states’ efforts to im­
plement the resolution. So far, implementation of UNSCR 1540 has been 
mixed. By the end of the first deadline for submitting comprehensive re­
ports, only 54 states had reported to the 1540 Committee.50 While some 
states provided detailed and lengthy reports on their governments’ efforts 
on nonproliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, others 
filed cursory documents that arguably failed to address their obligations. 
Reporting requirements in this area may be useful, but Resolution 1540 
simply makes clear that the international community opposes state trans­
fer of biological weapons to nonstate actors. In Article II, the BWC al­
ready broadly prohibits the development of biological weapons; thus, this 
self-reporting requirement was not a giant leap forward in arms control. 
Moreover, without an effective verification mechanism, many states will 
continue to be concerned about shadowy connections between “rogue” 
regimes and terror networks.51 
A number of cynical analysts and scientists accuse the United States 
and other advanced states of opposing a verification protocol because they 
covertly possess advanced biological weapons capabilities.52 If spotlighted, 
such capabilities could undermine the arms control regime. Setting aside 
this accusation, even defensive (or “protective” in the words of the BWC) 
and thus technically legal research potentially invites the collapse of the bio­
logical weapons arms control regime. Put simply, biological research pro­
grams in the United States, Europe, and throughout the developed world 
are vast in scope and serve to highlight the problem of dual development. 
In the guise of defensive biowarfare, for example, the United States has 
constructed a vast research base constituted by an impressive infrastruc­
ture of labs and equipment. The anthrax attacks of fall 2001, particularly 
if they were the work of a single attacker—as the FBI has concluded—at a 
minimum reveal that American scientists working in defensive biological 
weapons programs can produce bioweapons with deadly capabilities. This 
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is no small matter. As Ambassador Mahley pointed out when explaining 
the US rejection of the BWC verification protocol, America has “tens of 
thousands” of facilities “potentially relevant to the Convention.”53 Presum­
ably, the world’s other advanced industrial states likewise have thousands 
of technical facilities with “dual use” capability. Analysts at the Center for 
Arms Control and Non-Proliferation worry that US biological weapons 
research “appears to be encouraging increased biodefense research around 
the world. Such research is precisely the type that raises the greatest dual-
use concerns.” The center’s statement continues: 
Even worse, because of their dual-use nature, biodefense activities undertaken as 
a hedge against technological surprise and the unpredictability of potential adver­
saries can generate significant uncertainty among outside observers about their 
true intent. This problem is most severe for threat assessment research, which is 
usually conducted in secret. 
Secrecy in biodefense is increasing, both in the United States and around the world. 
Secretive biodefense activities threaten to provoke a very real biological arms race as 
countries react to the suspected capabilities and activities of others and seek to an­
ticipate and counter potential offensive developments by potential adversaries.54 
Because of the failure to secure biological weapons disarmament, the exist­
ing flawed arms control regime could soon collapse and bioweapons capa­
bilities could proliferate widely. 
On the plus side of the equation, the supplies and equipment necessary for 
large-scale biological dual-use research and development are primarily pro­
duced by a small number of technologically advanced states.55 At present, only 
a few states possess the means for large-scale vaccine production.5 Lack­
ing domestic suppliers, challenger states interested in biological weapons, 
especially those in the global south, will have to rely upon international 
sources to obtain dual-use supplies and equipment. For those nations, 
such dependency upon international sources creates a potential bottleneck 
for the proliferation of biological weapons. States that possess the means 
for large-scale production of bioweapons effectively control access to dual-
use biotechnology. These biotechnology supplier states can restrict or even 
deny the sale or transfer of dual-use biotechnology to developing ones, 
especially to those deemed as potential challengers. 
Indeed, the so-called Australia Group (AG), an informal arrangement 
of states created in 1985, exploits such bottlenecks by relying upon export 
controls and licensing measures to limit the proliferation of chemical and 
biological weapons.5 The AG originally focused on chemical weapons pro­
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liferation but turned its attention to biological weapons in the early 1990s 
after disclosures about the illicit Iraqi program. One serious weakness of 
the AG is that Russia, with its dubious history of noncompliance with the 
BWC, does not belong to the group. Challenger states might also be able 
to evade the AG by “using transshipment points and shell companies.”58 
Unfortunately, the AG is a voluntary consultative regime and member 
states are under no legally binding agreement to adhere to the established 
export controls on dual-use biotechnology. This lack of specific enforce­
ment provisions makes it somewhat likely that states will eventually have 
to rely upon interdiction at sea to assure compliance. More than 90 states 
are partners of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), in fact, which 
promises to force confrontations between member-state naval vessels and 
ships carrying cargo from rogue states.59 Alleged “outlaws” targeted by the 
AG and the PSI will undoubtedly complain about great-power applica­
tion of double standards to maintain oligopoly control of biotechnology. 
Moreover, while the purpose of such actions would be to seize technolo­
gies capable for use to develop “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD), 
it is certainly possible that such confrontations could provide the kind of 
concrete evidence about proliferation that would lead worried states to 
undertake more dangerous preemptive or preventive military actions. 
Some legal scholars note that despite the breakdown of the verification 
protocol and the technological weakening of the arms control regime, 
various states have taken measures to strengthen the taboo against bio­
weapons use. Primarily, this has been accomplished by states withdrawing 
their previous reservations to the original Geneva Protocol and thereby 
renouncing their right to retaliate in-kind to a bioweapons attack.0 Most 
recently, the state parties to the BWC met in Geneva in 200 for the 
Sixth Review Conference on the treaty. The results of this conference 
were unremarkable, as states did not agree to new verification procedures. 
Rather, states are supposed to adopt “national measures” to implement 
BWC prohibitions and to establish and maintain security and oversight 
over pathogenic microorganisms and toxins. Conferees also called for 
enhanced international capabilities for “responding to, investigating and 
mitigating the effects of cases of alleged use of biological or toxin weapons 
or suspicious outbreaks of disease” and “strengthening and broadening na­
tional and international institutional efforts and existing mechanisms for 
the surveillance, detection, diagnosis and combating of infectious diseases 
affecting humans, animals, and plants.” In addition to these health-related 
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measures, states are supposed to develop and adopt codes of conduct 
applicable to their scientists.1 Finally, the parties reaffirmed all articles 
of the BWC. To facilitate confidence-building measures and assist in ad­
ministrative duties with regards to the BWC, the member states agreed to 
establish an implementation support unit in Geneva. Again, however, the 
final document did not include a legally binding verification protocol for 
the bioweapons treaty. Clearly, despite the wishes of many other states, 
the United States continues to be sufficiently powerful to preclude any 
agreement requiring on-site inspections of potential biological weapons fa­
cilities.2 Bioweapons specialist Jonathan Tucker recently pointed out that 
the Democratic Clinton administration did not act forcefully to battle do­
mestic interests opposed to a strict bioweapons verification regime—and 
that those interests became even more powerful in the George W. Bush 
era. As a result, Tucker is not optimistic that the new political administra­
tion in Washington will alter the US negotiating position.3 
As demonstrated throughout the last two sections, states have long at­
tempted to develop arms control and disarmament measures that limit 
both the acquisition and the use of biological weapons. However, the lat­
est efforts to limit biological weapons capabilities by the creation of a veri­
fication protocol have been effectively abandoned, even as the normative 
taboo against the use of these weapons has remained in place—and been 
strengthened. Recent efforts to limit capabilities, such as UNSC Resolu­
tion 1540, the Australia Group, and the Proliferation Security Initiative, 
are arguably linked fairly directly to so-called counterproliferation 
strategy.4 These measures address state capabilities but are intended to 
focus on specific national regimes allegedly tied to terrorists. As will be 
shown in the concluding section, this is a worrisome development given 
that more and more states have signaled their willingness to embrace mili­
tary counterproliferation tactics that would feature anticipatory attacks 
against specific “outlaw” states that they believe will use WMDs. The next 
section explains the strategic implications of a biological weapons taboo in 
an era of counterproliferation and a global “war on terrorism.” 
The Dangers of a Bioweapons Taboo 
Utilization of biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons is now generally 
understood to be abhorrent and illegitimate. In an interesting and growing 
literature, a number of scholars of international relations have examined 
the development of taboos that prohibit the use of these weapons of mass 
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destruction.5 Their research explains how the taboos developed over time 
and came to be widely shared in world politics. In his study of the chemical 
weapons (CW) taboo, for instance, Richard Price identifies a “tradition of 
practice that forbids the use of CW and characterizes it as abnormal be­
havior among the society of states.” Price points out that these weapons are 
uniquely stigmatized among “countless cruel technological innovations in 
weaponry.” Similarly, Nina Tannenwald examines the development of “a 
normative prohibition on nuclear use,” widely acknowledged as a “nuclear 
taboo,” which has proven “essential to explaining why nuclear weapons have 
remained unused.”8 Numerous scholars and policy actors have similarly 
referenced a long-standing taboo against biological weapons use.9 
A taboo prohibiting use of a particular kind of weapon is not the same 
as an arms control prohibition banning the production or maintenance 
of weapons capabilities. In fact, the taboo outlawing nuclear use explicitly 
does not extend to development and deployment of those weapons. As 
Tannenwald notes in regard to nuclear weapons, it is “easier to ban the 
use of nuclear weapons than to ban the weapons themselves.”0 Though 
great powers promised under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty to negotiate “in good faith” towards “nuclear disarmament,” their 
disinterest in that outcome clearly limits the overall meaning of the taboo 
banning nuclear use. For example, the prohibition against nuclear use has 
certainly not eliminated all security fears related to the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. Throughout the nuclear era, activists and analysts alike 
have worried that the existence of atomic weapons poses a real threat to 
global security. Nuclear anxiety clearly undergirded the 1950s efforts to 
ban the bomb, the 1980s attempts to establish a nuclear freeze, and grow­
ing post–9/11 acceptance of the logic of preventive attacks. In the case of 
the overall nuclear weapons regime, however, the force of a taboo is obvi­
ously strengthened by the reality of deterrence. 
In contrast, the current biological weapons regime is overly reliant upon 
the taboo against use, making it ill-considered and potentially antithetical 
to security goals. First, biological agents produce a less detectable pro­
duction and delivery “footprint,” making retaliation (and thus deterrence) 
much more difficult and problematic.1 Effectively, the current interna­
tional regime allows many states to retain bioweapons capabilities that will 
be viewed by other states as illegal, immoral, and threatening. This is espe­
cially worrisome in a global context that finds various state leaders publicly 
challenging deterrence theory, embracing the logic of preventive war, and 
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attributing hostile intentions to other states—occasionally labeled as evil, 
rogue, or outlaw countries—because of their domestic political structure, 
nonsecular leadership, alleged links to transnational terrorist groups, and/ 
or perceived hostility to other states.2 As John Borrie of the UN Institute 
for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) predicted at a September 2005 
briefing about the Biological Weapons Convention, “Understanding hos­
tile intent [is] going to become more important than merely recognizing 
where capacity exists, because the latter will become widespread.”3 In 
August 2009, Amb. Kenneth Brill, director of the National Counterpro­
liferation Center, suggested that this forecast future had arrived. He pessi­
mistically summarized the spread of dual-use biological technologies and 
declared, “To put it plainly then, the WMD proliferation challenge in the 
21st Century is keeping states and nonstate actors from doing what they 
can do if they choose to do so . . . we are dealing with WMD counterpro­
liferation as more than a technical issue and increasing the emphasis on 
issues like intentions and motivations.”4 
Ultimately, we do not argue for complete rejection of the current bio­
logical weapons taboo. We do worry, however, that additional bioweap­
ons proliferation seems inevitable, particularly if states do not adopt more 
sweeping arms control measures. We attempt to demonstrate the addi­
tional great need for an arms control and disarmament component of 
the regime that might altogether eliminate bioweapons and extend the 
meaning and scope of the taboo. The current bioweapons taboo against 
use needs to be paired with meaningful arms control to form a regime and 
strengthened taboo resembling the efforts to limit chemical weapons pro­
liferation and use. Precisely because biological weapons attacks are consid­
ered abhorrent, states will continue to fear the development and potential 
use of these weapons. Failure to control the proliferation of biological 
weapons capabilities could substantially increase the likelihood of war as 
states pursue counterproliferation policies that will attempt to prevent 
surprise attacks. Indeed, the United States and other nations may well 
have already embraced national strategies that exhibit zero tolerance for 
bioweapons proliferation—at least toward worrisome challenger states. 
The counterproliferation initiatives and preventive war threats embraced 
by the United States have to date been tied to alleged intentions of certain 
rogue states to pursue weapons of mass destruction rather than to specific 
material capabilities. In addition to developing the regime to include more 
sweeping arms control and disarmament measures, we would call on states 
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to use great caution before launching anticipatory strikes against other 
states. Indeed, states should reduce the risks tied to the current taboo by 
using multilateral mechanisms to determine the gravity of threats and to 
decide appropriate solutions to those threats. 
It seems clear that many states possess or will soon develop bioweapons 
capabilities that other states view as threatening. In August 2002, then–US 
undersecretary of state for arms control and international security John 
Bolton declared, “The United States believes that over a dozen countries 
are pursuing biological weapons.”5 The James Martin Center for Non­
proliferation Studies (CNS) similarly estimates that 14 states maintain ac­
tive biological weapons research programs: Algeria, China, Cuba, Egypt, 
India, Iran, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, Sudan, Syria, and 
Taiwan. From that list, the US government has long accused Cuba, Iran, 
Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria of sponsoring terrorism, though 
Libya and North Korea were recently removed from the official State De­
partment listing. Potentially, the roster of states pursuing worrisome 
WMD capabilities of any type could be much longer and the threshold for 
implementing counterproliferation policies concomitantly lower. Former 
US special advisor David Kay, who originally led the Iraq Survey Group 
effort to locate WMD, told Congress in January 2004 that “probably 50 
countries” are developing “weapons of mass destruction–related program 
activities.”8 In his 2004 State of the Union address, then-president George 
W. Bush used that exact phrase to describe Iraqi WMD developments 
and to justify in hindsight the US decision to go to war. Indeed, Bush 
reminded his audience that a crucial “part of the offensive against terror” 
involves “confronting the regimes that harbor and support terrorists, and 
could supply them with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.”9 
As Schelling and Halperin explained decades ago, certain weapons sys­
tems seem especially threatening to other states and might provoke war. 
Such weapons should be the prime concern of arms controllers. Arguably, 
biological weapons pose exactly this kind of threat—feared especially by 
the United States in recent years, but by other states as well. The very 
political leaders who might decide to use force to counter the risks posed 
by tyrannical regimes or suicidal terrorists argue that deterrent threats will 
be insufficient.80 For this reason, since 2001, under the so-called Bush 
Doctrine, the United States has threatened to attack states that it fears 
might use WMDs or transfer these arms to terrorists. In December 2002, 
the Bush White House released a National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 
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Mass Destruction that declared simply, “We will not permit the world’s 
most dangerous regimes and terrorists to threaten us with the world’s most 
destructive weapons.”81 The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America was even more direct about the need for preventive ac­
tion “to stop rogue states and their terrorist clients before they are able 
to threaten or use weapons of mass destruction . . . even if uncertainty 
remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.”82 
It is important to note that the Bush White House was neither the 
first nor the last US administration to threaten war or preventive strikes 
because of the proliferation of WMD. Moreover, the United States is not 
the only state to threaten proliferant states with preventive war. As Scott 
Sagan and Marc Trachtenberg have documented, many US government 
officials supported preventive war options against new Soviet nuclear ca­
pabilities during the 1950s and against other subsequent proliferants.83 
For example, John F. Kennedy’s administration “came dangerously close” 
to ordering strikes against nascent Chinese nuclear capabilities in 193.84 
Somewhat more recently, ad hoc hostility to new proliferant states was 
turned into a more concrete antiproliferation policy. In December 1993, 
Bill Clinton’s then–secretary of defense Les Aspin announced a defense 
counterproliferation initiative, which the DoD defined even then as a 
mission in “support of proliferation prevention and intelligence activities; 
deterring the use of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons; defending 
against such weapons and their effects; and maintaining a robust ability 
to find and destroy delivery forces and infrastructure elements with mini­
mum collateral effects, should this become necessary.”85 Secretary Aspin 
noted that counterproliferation provided “a military planning process for 
dealing with adversaries who have weapons of mass destruction. And our 
concerns are by no means limited to the nuclear threat.” He noted, for 
instance, a new effort “to oversee all DoD biological defense programs.”8 
Historian Marc Trachtenberg points out that the Clinton counterprolif­
eration policy was tested in 1994 when he colorfully concludes that “the 
smell of war was in the air” vis-à-vis North Korea. He claims, in fact, that 
“the policy the Clinton administration pursued toward North Korea in 
1994 was cut from the same cloth as the Bush strategy.”8 Apparently, the 
central difference between the Clinton and Bush strategies is that the more 
recent administration was more overt about its plans in the post–9/11 era 
and actively sought to emphasize “counterproliferation” rather than tradi­
tional nonproliferation strategies, which at least partly reflected the Bush 
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government’s publicly stated doubts about the utility of arms control.88 
The Proliferation Security Initiative is effectively a formalized organiza­
tional measure, backed by the US Navy and nearly 100 states, which will 
assure continuation of counterproliferation strategy into the future. 
Will Pres. Barack Obama abandon counterproliferation, or has he, too, 
threatened to use preventive military measures against such threats? While 
it seems likely that the Obama administration will not refer publicly or ad­
miringly to a “Bush Doctrine,” the new president has frequently signaled 
that he shares his predecessors’ worries about the threats posed by bio­
logical and nuclear weapons—and the need to take the offensive against 
the states and their potential terrorist partners that pose these threats. 
His 2008 campaign document on Confronting 21st Century Threats listed 
“biological attacks,” along with nuclear weapons and cyber warfare, as 
“three potentially catastrophic threats” faced by the United States.89 At a 
Purdue University Summit on Confronting New Threats, Obama claimed 
that “the successful deployment of biological weapons . . . could kill tens 
of thousands of Americans and deal a crushing blow to our economy.”90 
Moreover, like many within the Bush national security team, Obama has 
expressed concern that “there are certain elements within the Islamic world 
right now that don’t make those same calculations” that the Soviet leader­
ship did about the basic logic of deterrence (“they don’t want to be blown 
up, we don’t want to be blown up”).91 In an interview with the Chicago 
Tribune in 2004, Obama specifically worried about an inability to deter 
radicals within Iran and Pakistan. 
Moreover, President Obama has often expressed a willingness to use 
force to address threats posed by rogue states and terrorists. Echoing Bush, 
Obama has frequently said that he “won’t take any options off the table, in­
cluding military, to prevent” one worrisome “game changing” scenario— 
Iran “obtaining a nuclear weapon.”92 To define precisely what this might 
mean, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton openly speculated in June 2009 
about a United States “first strike” against Iran like the prior attack on Iraq 
to remind Tehran that “their pursuit of nuclear weapons will actually trig­
ger greater insecurity.”93 President Obama has similarly said he would act 
preventively against biological threats. In an interview with Arms Control 
Today, he noted, “To prevent bioterror attacks, I will strengthen US intel­
ligence collection overseas to identify and interdict would-be bioterrorists 
before they strike.”94 In the case of Pakistan, where Osama bin Laden and 
other al-Qaeda terrorists have apparently fled, candidate Obama pointed 
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to a willingness to strike against “al-Qaeda in their [Pakistani] territory . . . 
if they could not or would not do so, and we had actionable intelligence.” 
He continued with a more sweeping statement a few moments later: “My 
job as commander in chief will be to make sure that we strike anybody 
who would do America harm when we have actionable intelligence to do 
that.”95 Even though Obama embraces the traditional international legal 
standard limiting the ability to strike other states to cases when the United 
States faces an “imminent threat,” he has written that “al-Qaeda qualifies 
under this standard, and we can and should carry out preemptive strikes 
against them whenever we can.”9 In practice, the Obama administration 
has continued the Bush policy of making strikes inside Pakistan using 
Predator drone aircraft armed with missiles. Indeed, the current adminis­
tration reportedly expanded attacks well beyond tribal border areas more 
deeply into Pakistan.9 
The United States is certainly not the only country that has embraced 
preventive counterproliferation and counterterrorism policies in the 
post–9/11 era. Dombrowski and Payne find that while “views expressed 
by other states do not align perfectly with the positions held by US of­
ficials,” who embrace a rationale for preventive war, “they do suggest that 
the international community is beginning to embrace some of the Bush 
Doctrine’s underlying logic. A sizeable number [of states] seem to agree 
that the risk of calamitous surprise attacks, especially with chemical, bio­
logical or nuclear weapons, might well justify preventive strikes against 
terrorists or preventive wars against their state sponsors.”98 The United 
Kingdom, Italy, and Australia willingly joined Washington in its attack on 
Iraq and used much the same rationale for publicly justifying this action. 
Israel has threatened to attack Iran, and both Russia and India have at 
times openly admired the logic of America’s counterproliferation initia­
tives. In all, Dombrowski and Payne find that the world seems to be em­
bracing a new international norm allowing preventive strikes to address 
threats associated with weapons of mass destruction. 
These counterproliferation policies are particularly worrisome when 
threats are said to be defined by perceived hostile intentions rather than by 
imminent military threats. In fact, by linking alleged threats to national 
regime type, the United States and other states have embraced a double 
standard that arguably threatens the nonproliferation regime. American 
policy makers openly define “evil” or “outlaw” states by their domestic po­
litical structure, nonsecular leadership, alleged ties to transnational terror­
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ists, and/or perceived animosity. Washington, for instance, has frequently 
accused Iran, Saddam-era Iraq, Libya, Syria, and North Korea of pursu­
ing biological and other weapons of mass destruction, even as it turned 
a blind eye toward Israeli WMD status over the years.99 Alleged WMD 
activity is described as illegal, illegitimate, and inhumane, but only when 
pursued by certain kinds of regimes. In contrast, as former undersecretary 
of state John Bolton admitted, “There are still other states with covert BW 
programs that we have not named in Biological Weapons Convention 
fora. The United States has spoken to several of these states privately.”100 
As Michael Krepon explains, by dividing the world “between responsible 
states—US friends and allies—and evildoers” in Conference on Disarma­
ment negotiation forums, “the Bush administration postulated and sought 
to enforce separate [arms control] norms for each camp.”101 For example, 
the Final Declaration of the Sixth Review Conference on the BWC does not 
include a key statement about compliance standards found in the Final 
Declaration of the Fourth Review Conference in 199 (the Fifth made no 
declaration): “Any noncompliance with its provisions could undermine 
confidence in the Convention. Noncompliance should be treated with 
determination in all cases, without selectivity or discrimination.”102 Dip­
lomats often charge that such inequitable application of standards under­
mines the legitimacy of nonproliferation norms.103 Further proliferation, 
in turn, increases the risk of the most worrisome implication of duplicity. 
States said to be evil, nondemocratic, hostile sponsors of terror wear a 
counterproliferation bulls-eye because they cannot be allowed to develop 
biological or other weapons of mass destruction. 
Conclusion 
The international community is constructing an inadequate and poten­
tially dangerous biological weapons taboo that rebukes the fundamental 
logic of arms control. Historically, states attempted to develop an arms 
control regime that limited both the acquisition and the use of biological 
weapons. However, in the most recent decade, efforts to limit biological 
weapons capabilities have stalled, even as prohibitions on biological weap­
ons use have been maintained and even strengthened. The new regime ef­
fectively allows states to retain suspicious capabilities that will be viewed as 
threatening by their peers. The United States is especially concerned about 
proliferation, though it embraces a double standard whereby it seems to 
tolerate WMD in the arsenals of friendly or democratic states. In any event, 
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the neglect of an arms control approach is particularly troublesome in an 
international context that embraces counterproliferation and the logic of 
preventive war—and attributes hostile intentions to “evil” states defined 
by their domestic political structure, nonsecular leadership, alleged ties to 
transnational terrorists, and/or perceived hostility to major powers. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to develop a workable inspection 
regime, but many experts in the field have offered what looks to be viable 
options.104 Specifically, we would strongly urge consideration of the kinds 
of detailed recommendations offered by a team of experts from the drug 
and biotechnology industries, defense contractors, and weapons inspec­
tion community assembled by the Stimson Center.105 According to these 
professionals, a robust verification regime requires deployment of teams 
of on-site inspectors with scientific and technical expertise in “biosafety 
engineering, aerobiology, molecular biology, and computers” as well as 
scientists with years of experience in pharmaceutical purification develop­
ment (from research laboratory bench scale to large-scale manufacturing) 
and auditing.10 Inspectors should initially perform open-source docu­
ment reviews of facilities, which should include facility blueprints and dia­
grams and personnel lists. Satellite photos would also be very helpful. Any 
discrepancies between the actual layout and the blueprints, diagrams, or 
photos would be investigated and accompanied by interviews with facility 
staff. Ideally, in fact, on-site teams should observe staffers in their research 
laboratories or manufacturing areas while they are working—then talk 
to them about their daily work and routines. Concerns about suspicious 
activities would trigger sampling of HEPA (high-efficiency particulate air) 
filters and waste treatment equipment in addition to laboratory counter-
tops. Storage refrigerators and freezers should be inspected and samples 
taken for testing, especially stored samples that are incorrectly labeled. 
Furthermore, to assure reliability, only validated assays or tests should be 
performed on the facility samples. The Stimson Center’s experts pointed 
out that the now-abandoned Verification Protocol assigned an inadequate 
number of inspectors to biological facilities and did not allot sufficient 
time for on-site inspections. 
Another group of experts from the University of Maryland’s Center for 
International and Security Studies has more recently proposed a some­
what unique international oversight system. The “International Patho­
gen Research Authority” they imagine would establish routine oversight 
protocols for a range of activities that trigger extreme, moderate, or only 
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potential concern.10 As with any effective system, it would have to be 
implemented globally and applied without exception to all scientists en­
gaged in relevant biological research. The proposed protocols include li­
censing, disclosure, and peer review processes geared around the kinds 
of risk-benefit calculations already developed for other areas of scientific 
research. The Maryland group favors video and electronic monitoring of 
work areas and equipment and places less emphasis on adversarial inspec­
tion processes. To work effectively, the entire enterprise must be backed 
by adequate resources and imbued with legitimate legal authority, likely 
as a result of an interstate treaty. To prevent abuse of power, the oversight 
system must include credible protections for industrial secrets. 
Regardless of the precise contours, the international community clearly 
needs to redouble its efforts to build a more effective and verifiable bio­
logical weapons arms control regime to augment the existing taboo. This 
will likely entail a comprehensive global system of peer oversight or in­
spection that is adequately funded and ideally linked to the BWC. While 
a relatively intrusive inspections regime might well cost billions of dollars, 
any such spending is likely to be dwarfed by the costs of “preventive” war 
or a biological weapons attack.108 
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